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ABSTRACT
“Tea and Sympathy”:
The United States and the Sudan Civil War, 1985-2005
Peter W. Klein
The specters of violence and economic insecurity have haunted 
the Sudan since its independence in 1956.  The United States 
Congress has held numerous hearings on the Sudan's civil war and 
U.S. television news outlets have reported on the conflict since 
1983.  While attempting to engage the Sudan in a viable peace 
process, the U.S. Congress has been beset by ineffectual Cold 
War paradigms and an inability to understand the complexities of 
the Sudan civil war.  U.S. television news programs, on the 
other hand, engaged in a process of oversimplification, using 
false dichotomies to reduce the conflict into easily digestible 
pieces.  This thesis will analyze the overall tone and focus of 
U.S. Congressional hearings and television news broadcasts on 
the Sudan and demonstrate the problematic factors in their 
portrayals of the war.  
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PREFACE
Independence and civil war came to the Sudan at nearly the 
same time.  The Sudan gained independence from British colonial 
rule in 1956, and only a year later the new nation took a 
precipitous turn toward civil war.  Although the Sudan 
essentially experienced one long civil war from 1956 until a 
2005 peace accord, a brief attempt at peace from 1972-1983 
effectively broke the war into two periods, 1956-1972 and 1985-
2005. Understanding this long, protracted civil war has proven 
difficult for the international community, especially those 
countries attempting to broker peace.  The United States has 
been at the forefront of those attempts at ending the conflict 
and has fallen victim to the same obstacles to comprehending the 
war. In order to identify and examine United States’ attitudes 
and misunderstandings of the second Sudanese Civil War, this 
thesis analyzes U.S. television news outlets and U.S. 
Congressional hearing transcripts from the time period 1985-
2005.   
Rife with complex ethnic rivalries and intricate political 
nuance, the Sudan Civil War often seems to escape explanation 
and understanding.  In addition, the brief period of peace that 
divided the civil war into two parts allowed outside observers 
to examine the second civil war independently of the first. 
Members of the United States Congress and television news 
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reporters embraced simplistic dichotomies, such as Arab vs. 
African and Muslim vs. Christian, instead of looking to the 
historical roots of the conflict.  The inability to grasp the 
complete complexities of this civil war has served to limit the 
ability of the United States to contribute effectively to any 
real change.  Exasperated with Congressional committee members’ 
refusal to understand the complexities and adopt a historical 
appreciation for the war, historian Robert O. Collins testified 
that the United States had little more to offer the people of 
the Sudan than “tea and sympathy.”1
Dominated by the paradigm of Cold War politics in the 
1980s, one can see a shift in the U.S. Congress as it shed its 
Cold War mindset throughout the 1990s and into the twenty-first 
century. Throughout the 1980s members of Congress investigated 
the Sudan’s nascent second civil war, 1985-2005, and the 
resulting humanitarian disaster in terms of self-serving 
politics. The Sudan became a place of great geo-strategic 
importance and U.S. politicians considered it to have the 
capacity to become a significant trading partner. In the 1990s 
and later, as the Cold War ended, the focus of Congressional 
inquiries moved from the United States’ self-preservation to a 
1 Robert O. Collins, testifying in United States Congress, Senate, The 
Crisis in Sudan, May 4, 1993, 30.  Mr. Collins answered “all I believe you 
can offer, senator, is tea and sympathy,” to the question of what the United 
States can do to solve the political crisis in the Sudan.
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more humanitarian inclined foreign policy. Congressmen and 
Senators waxed philosophic about the nature of human suffering 
in Africa's largest country and pondered on what exactly they 
could do to end this blight on the world's conscience.  Amid 
their self-congratulating and pompous speeches and their naïve, 
arrogant, and often redundant questions, Congressional hearings 
often amounted to little in the way of substantive discussion. 
They focused much of their time on the issue of humanitarianism, 
using the suffering of the Sudanese as a cop-out to discussing 
the true political nature of Sudanese problems. 
Often hearings became mired in the conventional wisdom 
surrounding the Sudanese Civil War: that it was North vs. South, 
Arab vs. African, Muslim vs. Christian. Although all three are 
indeed aspects of the civil war, standing alone none of them 
come close to describing the true nature of Sudanese aggression. 
The primary reason that the Sudan's civil war has been reduced 
to such simplistic explanations hinges on the fact that the 
hearings on the Second Civil War do not take into account the 
complexities and nuances of the First Civil War. In order to 
understand the Sudanese civil wars, one must take into account 
colonial and pre-colonial dynamics that dominated Sudanese life. 
In addition, the myriad ethnicities that comprise the Sudan 
existed with their very own political structures long before the 
Sudan became a country. Certainly, issues of religion, race, and 
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geographic location play a role, but they do not define the 
Sudanese struggle. This thesis analyzes U.S. Congressional 
hearings and American TV news broadcasts- the latter assembled 
by the Vanderbilt University Television News Archive- in an 
effort to demonstrate where each of these institutions failed to 
fully comprehend the complete nature of the Sudanese Civil War.  
The first chapter discusses the primary sources the author 
has chosen as the basis of his research and the reasoning behind 
his choices. Much of this chapter focuses on the TV News Archive 
at Vanderbilt University and the transcripts of Congressional 
hearings from the 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s. 
The second chapter explains the historical background 
surrounding the Sudan as a whole. Although the chapter primarily 
focuses on the Sudan's post-independence machinations, it does 
begin with a treatment on the Sudan’s role as a colony, first 
within the Turkish Empire and then as a part of the British 
colonial sphere. This chapter primarily serves as an 
introduction to the civil war which began shortly after 
independence. 
Three distinct case studies comprise chapters three, four, 
and five.  Chapter three discusses the simplistic dichotomies, 
African vs. Arab and Christian vs. Muslim, used by Congress and 
news outlets to describe the Sudan’s complex civil war. 
Congress’s and reporters’ reliance on these dichotomies led them 
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either to disregard or overlook the ethnic rivalries reviving in 
the South at this time.  Chapter four examines this intra-South 
civil war, primarily between the two largest ethnicities, Nuer 
and Dinka, and also the intra-Nuer fighting. Chapter five 
analyzes the effect of Cold War politics on the policy positions 
of, and testimony of witnesses to, the members of Congress.  The 
sixth and concluding chapter discusses the role of 
humanitarianism in Congress’ deliberative process and television 
news’ coverage, and the genocide in Darfur. 
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The Sudan has been mired in civil war since its inception 
as a newly formed country in 1956.  Born of Britain's hasty 
decision to divest itself from its colonial aspirations 
following World War II, the Sudan did not enter nationhood with 
a cohesive political structure in place.  Competition for 
political power and resources, especially between North and 
South, dominated political life. That struggle has lasted for 
the past fifty years.  Incessant civil war, with few respites of 
peace, has decimated the country, physically and mentally, 
leaving scars that may never heal.   For their part, foreign 
governments and media outlets have continually attempted to 
digest and understand the civil war as they see it.  However, 
oversimplification and lack of in-depth knowledge often beset 
their good intentioned reporting and deliberations on the second 
civil war.  Much of the relevant historical aspects and causes 
of the second civil war lie in the preceding war and the 
colonization period.  
The Sudan is the largest country in Africa and comprises a 
total area of almost two and a half million square kilometers.  
The name Sudan comes from the Arabic term for the swath of land 
that crosses the entire continent at relatively the same 
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longitudinal degrees as the Sudan, called the Bilad es Sudan,2 or 
“The land of the Blacks.”3 The Sudan gained its independence on 1 
January, 1956 after years of colonization, first under Turkish 
and then, finally, combined British-Egyptian rule.  During 
British colonization, the Northern half of the country, 
primarily Arab in make-up, and the Southern half, primarily 
black-African, progressed separately from each other with 
neither side coming into much contact with the other.  More 
politically astute than their Southern counterparts and having 
the nation's capital, Khartoum, in the North, the Northern Arabs 
enjoyed greater political power during and after colonization.
Following independence the Sudan quickly fell into civil 
war as Southern fears of Northern hegemony metastasized after 
Khartoum ordered Southern soldiers to transfer north.  Those 
soldiers mutinied and formed a guerilla army in the Sudanese 
periphery, sparking the first civil war that lasted until 1972.  
The Addis Ababa Peace Agreement of 1972 formally ended the first 
civil war and ushered in a scant eleven year period of uneasy 
truce and cease-fire.  The peace quickly ended in 1983 as 
Southern aspirations of political autonomy never materialized 
and Khartoum adopted Shari'a (Islamic law) as the basis for 
Sudanese law, angering many non-Muslims throughout the country.
2 One may also see the Arabic name for this area as the Bilad el Sudan 
or the Bilad al Sudan.
3 Ann Mosely Lesch, The Sudan: Contested National Identities 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998)25. 
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Members of Congress, witnesses, and TV news media, new to 
the Sudanese conflict, picked up on the issues of religion, the 
dichotomy of Christian vs. Muslim, and metamorphosed these into 
one issue, seeing it as the single greatest reason for war 
within the Sudan.   Reporters and members of Congress alike 
shunned a historical approach to viewing the Sudanese civil wars 
and instead boiled the conflict down into two easily 
recognizable actors, Christians and Muslims.  Admittedly, a 
black and white perception of the war is much easier to digest, 
but it makes for a poor understanding.  
Religion did not have an impact on the first civil war.  By 
focusing on the religious aspect of the second civil war, 
observers failed to appreciate the historical causes of the 
first civil war and then viewed the second conflict 
independently of the first; or worse yet, they retroactively 
imparted a religious tinge to the first civil war that does not 
belong there, often by conflating Arab with Muslim and Black-
African with Christian and then describing the Arab/African 
schism as Muslim vs. Christian.
With these sentiments in mind, this thesis analyzes the 
response and coverage of the second Sudanese civil war by the 
United States Congress and the major television news 
broadcasters in the United States.  The television news 
broadcasts considered in this thesis cover the entire period of 
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the second civil war, 1983-present, and come from the nationally 
televised broadcasting corporations: National Broadcasting 
Company (NBC), American Broadcasting Company (ABC), Columbia 
Broadcasting System (CBS), Fox News, and Cable News Network 
(CNN).  
The research for this thesis centers around the available 
television news broadcasts between the years 1983 and the 
present and was carried out at the Vanderbilt University 
Television News Archive in Nashville, Tennessee.  To simplify 
the searching process, the keyword search was limited to 
“Sudan,” viewing every news segment that contained any coverage 
of the Sudan between 1983 and the present, a total of fifty news 
segments.  The news broadcast sample begins in 1983 to get a 
sense of news coverage on the Sudan as the country again slid 
toward civil war.
The base research involved creating a detailed outline of 
each report, including quotations from the reporter.  
Congressional hearings were treated in much the same way.  The 
research focused on twelve hearings from the 1980s, 1990s, and 
early 2000s that were selected for their pertinence to this 
thesis.  The United States House of Representatives held eight 
of the hearings, while the Senate held the other four.  Instead 
of looking for specific instances of coded material, each 
hearing’s transcript was read and detailed outlines of the 
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proceedings were created.  
      While systematically analyzing the primary documents, 
common factors in both sets of material became obvious: a 
chronic lack of understanding and the inability to observe 
nuance.  These deficiencies led to an incomplete picture as 
presented by television news broadcasts and hindered Congress’ 
ability to formulate a viable peace plan.  After assembling all 
of the data, the hearings were analyzed for references to the 
three specific issues that comprise the analytical framework for 
the third, fourth, and fifth chapters: Arab/African dichotomy, 
ethnic violence, and cold war politics.  
For the reliance on the Arab/African and Muslim/Christian 
dichotomies, transcripts were analyzed for instances where 
either reporters or participants in the Congressional hearings 
described the Sudanese civil war as a clash between Arabs in the 
North and Africans in the South.  Occasionally, observers used 
religious affiliations in place of ethnicity, transposing Arab 
for Muslim and African for Christian.  
Both the Congressional hearings’ and the TV news 
broadcasts’ lack of discussion on the ethnic violence in 
Southern Sudan proved much more straight-forward: News outlets 
simply did not cover it; Congress did not investigate the 
matter.  Familiar with the intra-South fighting that plagued the 
second civil war, the author noticed a conspicuous dearth of 
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inquiries in Congress, and a complete lack of coverage in TV 
news programs.  Much of the discussion on intra-South fighting 
came from historians, experts in Sudanese history, who 
ultimately had little impact on the members of Congress who took 
their testimony.  
Congressional hearings during the Cold War presented the 
most interesting case study.  During the Cold War Congressional 
hearings discussed Sudanese politics vis-à-vis United States 
policy.  The United States acted friendly toward the Sudan only 
as long as America deemed it necessary.  Post Cold War hearings 
witnessed a relative reduction in friendly attitudes toward the 
Sudan and an increase in the amount of criticism for Khartoum.  
The interplay between television news broadcasts and 
Congressional hearings presents another interesting topic, 
perhaps for an additional study.  While it would be safe to 
assume that Congressional officials watched television news, the 
exact relationship between the two remains unclear.  Instances 
did arise where Congressional hearing attendees either commended 
the TV news media for its coverage or criticized media outlets 
for not paying enough attention.  These examples were few and 
far between and had no obvious impact on the Congressional 
proceedings.  
By far, most of the reports focused on the humanitarian 
disaster that resulted from the intense fighting and the relief 
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effort, often hampered by both sides' unwillingness to agree to 
a cease-fire and establish safe-havens for relief workers.  More 
salient to this study, however, was the news portrayal of the 
war.  Journalists invariably depicted the war as a struggle 
between an Islamic government and Christian rebels, seemingly 
averse to looking any deeper into the complicated history of the 
Sudan.
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CHAPTER 2
 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Since their independence in 1956 the Sudanese people have 
seen three failed attempts at democracy and two bloody, 
protracted civil wars.  Through mistaken, yet well intentioned, 
British policies, the Northern and Southern halves of the Sudan 
became entrenched in a political and ideological war.  Prior to 
British involvement, the Sudan had already been separated by the 
great religious divide that runs from the Atlantic Ocean to the 
Indian.  The divide separated Africans of Arab descent and 
culture from the predominantly Black Africans of the Sub-Saharan 
(those lands south of the Saharan desert).  This divide ran 
straight through the Sudan, pitting the Islamic North against a 
Christian-Animist South.4  
Southern Sudan had long been fertile ground for slave 
raiding Arabs from the north.  Even with frequent ventures 
south, the area beyond the Sahara largely remained a mystery to 
the North.  Northerners viewed the Southerners with disgust and 
contempt, while Southerners felt little but fear and trepidation 
toward their northern neighbors.  With good reason, Southerners 
feared a Northern army bent on creating an Islamic state. 
During Turco-Egyptian rule (1821-1880), the Sudanese effectively 
4 John Voll, “Effects of Islamic Structures on Modern Islamic Expansion 
in the Eastern Sudan,” The International Journal of African Historical 
Studies 7 (1974): 85.
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put aside their fears and differences and backed the Mahdi 
Revolt (1881-1898)5.  The revolt, for a time, delivered the Sudan 
from Egyptian domination but did little to abate the strong 
feelings each side held toward the other.6  
The British conquest of Egypt in 1881 proved helpful to the 
Sudan and the Mahdi Revolt.  Britain refused to entertain 
Egyptian desires to re-conquer Sudan for fear that it would be 
too costly.  But by 1895 it became clear Britain would have to 
consolidate its control in the area and sent an Egyptian army to 
defeat the Mahdi and his followers.  After four years of 
fighting the Sudan was again under foreign control and the new 
powers signed the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium Agreement in 1899. 
Although on paper some power rested in Egypt’s hands, Britain 
exercised full control over its new colony.7  
Within the Sudan the old antagonisms never died.  Indeed, 
British policy exacerbated the conflict between North and South. 
The manifestation of both sides anger came after Britain 
instituted the “Southern Policy.”  Although opposition to an 
Arab dominated state had begun years before, the causes for the 
war stem from British control and their implementation of this 
policy;  a policy that split the country in two and pitted the 
5 Carole Collins, “Colonialism and Class Struggle in the Sudan,” MERIP 
Reports 46 (April, 1976): 5.
6 Sam Sarkesian, “The Southern Sudan: A Reassessment,” African Studies 
Review 16 (1973): 2.
7 Carole Collins, “Colonialism and Class Struggle”, 6
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two sides against each other in a desperate battle for political 
power and state resources. 
The Southern Policy did not produce anger only in the 
South. The north viewed any attempts at separating the north of 
Sudan from the south as anathema.  Northern politicians based 
their assumption of rule on what Ann Mosely Lesch calls the 
Control Model;8 where adherents to this school of thought believe 
conflict would have been avoided through the inevitable 
Arabization of Southern Sudan had the British not stepped in. 
However, Lesch points out that these Northern intellectuals do 
not take into account the heterogeneous nature of the Sudan, 
where Arab and Islam were not the dominant cultures and the 
North/South conflict had been developing for many years prior to 
the Southern Policy.9  
Attempting to establish law and order, in 1898 the British 
re-conquered the Sudan and maintained power until 1952.10 
Understanding the harmful effects of slavery and unfair trade, 
8 As articulated by Ann Lesch, the control model asserts that the 
dominant culture within a state attempts to homogenize the state through 
assimilation, predicated on the belief that as the dominant culture it has 
the right to do so.  This is in opposition to the Ethnic Pluralist Model, 
which is a state where the government recognizes the different ethnic and 
racial groups within society, creating a space for all groups within the 
government. In a fairly extensive breakdown of Sudanese diversity, one can 
see that only 40% of the people in Northern Sudan categorize themselves as 
Arab, out of the 66% of the total population that live in Northern Sudan. 
Lesch,Contested Identities, 8-10, and chart, 17.
9 North/South contention resulted in part from a history of Southern 
enslavement by Northern Arabs and strong pressure for Southern Arabization 
from the North.
10 Abel Alier, “The Southern Sudan Question,” The Southern Sudan and the 
Problem of National Integration, ed. Dunstan M. Wai (London: Frank Cass, 
1973) 13.
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the British closed off Southern Sudan from the North. 
Northerners viewed the new restrictions as anti-Arab, 
reactionary, and asinine.  These restrictions included, but were 
not limited to: “the prohibition of Arabic, the abolition of 
Arab names, the wholesale accusations against all Northerners of 
being slave dealers, and the advantage given to Christian 
missionaries over Moslem preachers.”11  Abel Alier12, a Southern 
politician, claims that these measures proved overly zealous for 
a policy enacted to preserve southern culture, an aspiration 
essentially moral in nature 
The British decided to manage the South differently from 
the North prior to the implementation of a formal Southern 
Policy in 1930.  The Civil Secretary’s formal articulation of 
such a policy in 1930 established the Southern Sudan as 
culturally distinct from the North and would therefore  “develop 
along African, rather than Arab lines.”13  Essentially, in 1930, 
partition rendered policy.  The British established Sudanese 
government along a “series of self contained racial or tribal 
units based…upon indigenous customs, traditional usage and 
beliefs.”14  This policy left unanswered the question of to whom 
11 Alier, “Southern Sudan Question,” 15.
12 Mr. Alier was a prominent member of the Southern Front, President of 
the Regional Government in the Southern Sudan, Vice-President of the Sudan 
and spokesman for the South at the Roundtable Conference.
13 Douglas Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press,  2003) 11.
14 Appendix 1, “1930 Memorandum on Southern Policy”, in Southern Sudan 
and National Integration, ed. Wai, 175.
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the area of Southern Sudan would belong; whether it would stay 
within the Sudan or go to the British East Africa Company.  The 
Southern Policy coincided with the Closed District Ordinance of 
1922 that restricted the movement of non-Southerners within 
Southern Sudan.  These two policies further divided North and 
South in their respective practices of government and 
administration.
With their civilizing mission incomplete, the British did 
not give much consideration to Sudanese independence. Much was 
still to do by way of creating a stable nation-state. 
Fortunately, or unfortunately, for the Sudanese, just prior to 
World War II, a new crop of British civil servants made their 
way to the Sudan, often working as low level assistants.  These 
were the men born and bred in a time of great unrest, World War 
I and the depression, and they questioned Britain’s long held 
assertion of its right to possess and colonize foreign lands.15 
These men, decades later, came to occupy the senior offices they 
had earlier assisted.   Sir Douglas Newbold, appointed Civil 
Secretary in 1939, became the patriarch for this progressive 
group of civil servants.  Around this same time, Gordon College 
and other Sudanese institutions began churning out graduates, 
creating an educated elite class within society.  The educated 
Sudanese challenged the British decision to allow Egyptian 
15 Robert O. Collins, The British in the Sudan, 1898-1956, ed. Robert O. 
Collins and Francis M. Deng (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1984) 19.
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officials back into the Sudan in 1936 and aspired to become 
spokesmen for the nationalist cause in the Sudan.16  Through the 
Graduates’ General Congress, these educated elites addressed 
both the Sudanese people and the British government.  The 
British, even with this new liberal and tolerant political 
service at work in the Sudan, did not allow the Congress to 
speak on behalf of the Sudanese people for independence.  This 
effectively split the Congress into two halves, the moderate 
Umma Party, which accepted British wisdom in the matters of 
government, and an extremist party, Ashiqqa’ (Brothers), led by 
Isma’il al-Azhari.17  Northerners dominated both of these 
political parties and allowed Southerners a very small role in 
any discussions.  Northern domination quickly became the 
paradigm for Sudanese politics.
Sudanese politicians and the British did not officially 
discuss the Southern Sudan until the Juba Conference of 1947, to 
which they only invited eighteen Southerners.  According to the 
Civil Secretary who called the meeting, Sir James Robertson, the 
Juba Conference was not a meeting intended to create any new 
policy.  Sir Robertson merely wanted to gauge the political 
proficiency of the Southerners.  He states that he only invited 
eighteen because “there were no provincial advisory councils in 
the South at this time and so no way of electing representatives 
16 Collins, British in the Sudan, 20.
17 Collins, British in the Sudan, 21.
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to come to my Juba conference.”18  Robertson concluded that 
Southerners employed sound political acumen and would, 
therefore, not be dominated by the North within a unified 
national assembly.  
The British acceptance of a Sudanese legislative council 
encompassing both halves of the Sudan angered many within Egypt, 
most importantly King Faruq.  He summarily revoked the Anglo-
Egyptian treaty of 1936 and declared himself king of Egypt and 
the Sudan.  In response, the British refused to acknowledge the 
end of the treaty and proposed a “self-governing statute for the 
Sudan in the Legislative Council.”19  However, self-determination 
for the Sudan would not have been possible had Nasser not led 
the Free Officers Revolution in Egypt in 1952.  With Egypt’s 
old-guard out of power, Sudan had a new ally in their quest for 
independence.  In 1952 all parties agreed to Sudanese 
independence within three years and Sudan held its first 
elections for a representative parliament in 1953.  Problems, 
however, quickly ensued.  By voting for the NUP (National 
Unionist Party), many Sudanese felt they were voting for 
independence from Britain.  They realized by 1954 that they were 
in fact voting for a party backed by Egypt, a sworn enemy of 
many in the state, especially in the South.  They did not want 
18 Sir James Robertson, Transition in Africa (New York: Harper and Row 
Publishers, 1974) 107.
19 Collins, British in the Sudan, 25.
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their future tied to that of Egypt, sparking massive 
demonstrations within Sudan and a mutiny by Southern soldiers of 
the Equatoria Corps in 1955.20  
Shortly thereafter, the first civil war began following the 
soldiers’ mutiny in the southern town of Torit.  Southern fears 
of Northern domination had long been simmering, but neither side 
had yet to take up armed struggle.  The murder of Northern 
civilians in the South by these soldiers can be seen as the 
first casualties of this war, and the reaction by the North the 
first counterattack.  The mutiny itself proved more helpful to 
Sudanese sovereignty than Southern politics.   Britain no longer 
wanted the responsibility of presiding over a country falling 
precipitously into civil war.  Ironically, Southern armed 
resistance was an attempt to force the British to notice the 
South more and give it more rights within government.  According 
to Douglas Johnson, “the final paradox of Sudanese independence 
was that it was thrust upon the Sudan by a colonial power eager 
to extricate itself from its residual responsibilities.”21 
Independence was not predicated along a national sentiment and 
was, therefore, doomed from the start.  Everyone in the Sudan 
wanted independence, but the mechanisms were not in place to 
ready everyone for it.  Coupled with the deep resentment between 
the North and South, independent Sudan had but one option, civil 
20 Collins, British in the Sudan, 25.
21 Johnson, Root Causes, 29.
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war.  
The deep schism between North and South Sudan was not that 
the North was predominantly Muslim or that the South was 
predominantly Christian or Animist.  Instead, the resentment 
grew out of the North’s never ending attempt of Arabization in 
the South.  As the majority group, the Arabs in the North 
believed they had a right to assimilate the peoples of the South 
into an Islamic republic, encompassing all of the Sudan.  This 
is what inspired the South to take up arms.  Khartoum expelled 
all Christian missionaries from the South in 1964 and 
accompanied its attempt at Islamization with repressive 
campaigns of terror against Southern populations in the late 
1950s and early 1960s.22  Fearing possible arrest or execution, 
many politicians in the South fled to border countries or the 
bush.  Many politicians and academics formed political parties, 
en émigré, fighting for Southern rights and freedoms.  In 1963, 
the Anya Nya was established, comprised primarily of the 1955 
mutineers, Southern police officers, and civil servants.  The 
Anya Nya was the military wing of SANU (Sudan Africa National 
Union) but quickly grew tired of politicians directing them from 
exile.  Within the Sudan, the various Anya Nya regiments 
coalesced under the leadership of Lt. General Joseph Lagu in 
1970.
22Johnson, Root Causes, 31.
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With an opposition military in place, the civil war lacked 
only a mass movement.  The Sudan did not have long to wait.  The 
October Revolution of 1964 effectively ousted Gen. Abboud from 
power, forcing him to relinquish control to a transitional 
military council.  The revolution began after police opened fire 
on a peaceful demonstration at the University of Khartoum. 
These students strongly disliked the Khartoum military and many 
sympathized with the Southern cause.  The police, not equipped 
or trained to deal with riots, opened fire on the crowd killing 
one and injuring nine.  At the funeral the next day, an angry 
mob denounced the Abboud regime and the University of Khartoum 
staff resigned in protest.  Professionals and non-professional 
workers quickly joined the professors in protest.  On October 
26, 1964, oppositional leaders called for a general strike.23 
General Abboud agreed to hand over power and the revolution 
proved a temporary success.
The new transitional government did not fare much better. 
Led by Sir al-Khatim al-Khalifa, Northerners saw the new 
government as a concession to the Southern people.  A Northerner 
well liked in the South, al-Khalifa viewed the “Southern problem 
as a political question and not a military one.”24  Khartoum and 
the Anya Nya were even able to negotiate a cease-fire.  But two 
23 Mohamed Omer Beshir, Revolution and Nationalism in the Sudan (London: 
Harper and Row Publishers, 1974) 215.
24 Kyle Keith, “The Sudan Today,” African Affairs 65 (1966): 239.
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problems arose: the state of emergency was not lifted and the 
Anya Nya had poor communications between its regiments.  In al-
Khalifa’s refusal to abrogate the state of emergency, the South 
saw no real difference between the new government and the old 
regime, leading to further animosity between the North and 
South.  Second, poor communication within Anya Nya meant that 
not everybody heard the cease-fire, which led to more fighting.  
The Round Table Conference of 1965 proved another failure. 
The Anya Nya continued their attack during the conference, 
weakening the Sudan’s negotiating position.  Fighting kept the 
South from voting in the 1965 elections and left the South with 
no representatives in the new parliament.  The South did not do 
much better in the 1968 elections, when power was still 
concentrated in the hands of Islamist regimes in the North.  The 
lack of members in parliament in 1965 allowed for the government 
to unleash its security forces on the South under the guise of 
restoring law and order.  The civil war intensified and Northern 
soldiers arbitrarily murdered many unarmed civilians in the 
South.  The parliament also kept up efforts to assimilate the 
South into an all-Islamist country.25
The coup of 1969, orchestrated by Jafaar Numeiri, was seen 
as an opportunity for a non-sectarian government and a possible 
lull in fighting.  Although the south got in Numeiri a 
25 Lesch, Contested Identities, 43.
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secularist, he was still a highly authoritarian dictator with a 
new policy focused on pan-Arabism.  Numeiri viewed the South as 
an integral part of the Sudan and considered treasonous any 
attempts at secession.  To combat the Southern troops, he 
stationed two-thirds of his troops in the South and sporadically 
attacked Anya Nya soldiers.26  Then, as soon as it started, it 
seemed the fighting would come to an end, much to the 
astonishment of everybody.  Both sides had grown weary of the 
struggle and Numeiri realized his forces could not defeat the 
Anya Nya as long as they continued their guerilla tactics.  For 
the Anya Nya, their numbers were too small to openly attack 
Numeiri’s forces and they could not win using its guerilla 
tactics.  Both sides came to a standstill and wanted an end to 
the fighting.  
The Addis Ababa Peace Accords of 1972 effectively brought 
to an end the first civil war in the Sudan.  But it was clear 
the peace would not last.  Both sides failed to achieve any 
victory at the negotiating table.  The whole Southern movement 
had been predicated on the fight for independence from the 
North, but the best they received from the treaty was regional 
autonomy.  Khartoum began a campaign to eradicate Southern 
forces, mainly the Anya Nya, and Arabize the people and the 
land.  Numeiri managed to keep the Sudan together but had to 
26 Sarkesian, “Southern Sudan,” 15.
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give autonomy to its provinces.  Clearly, neither side won.  
Infighting marred both the North’s and the South’s 
political positions giving the peace accords little chance of 
surviving.  Southern politics came to be dominated by two men: 
Abel Alier and Joseph Lagu.  Alier was president of the High 
Executive Council (HEC) managing the South from 1972-1978 but 
came to be seen as a supporter of Numeiri.  He allowed the 
president to curtail Southern regional government authority, 
which resulted in South having no control over its economy or 
education.  Hoping for change, Southerners elected Joseph Lagu 
president of the HEC in 1978.  As president, Lagu attempted to 
replace the Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the regional 
government.  His subsequent fight with the judiciary led to a 
temporary shutdown of the court system.  In response, Numeiri 
dissolved the national and regional assemblies and held new 
elections in which Alier was again elected president of the HEC.27
In the North, Numeiri felt pressure of his own. 
Northerners did not appreciate the level of autonomy, however 
paltry it was, afforded to the South in the Addis Ababa Peace 
Accords.  Numeiri, up to this point, had received more support 
from the South because of his concessions in the peace accords 
than in the North.  Two coup attempts made him nervous of 
outside forces, prompting him to issue a National Reconciliation 
27 Johnson, Root Causes, 43.
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that allowed all of those responsible for the coup attempts to 
come back into the government.  Support from the South waned 
with the new influx of Islamists back into the country.  
The economy also declined.  Efforts to modernize its 
agricultural capacity fell short and the Sudan was deeply 
indebted to outside creditors by 1980.  In 1977-1978 the Sudan 
was unable to pay its debts as they came due.  The United States 
stepped in and restructured its debt, but the country remained 
in very bad shape.  The National Reconciliation allowed for 
Islamists to have a greater hand in government and welcomed the 
ideas the United States put forward concerning privatizing the 
Sudan’s public corporations.  The government used all Islamic 
banks for lines of credit.28  With the economy in shambles Numeiri 
searched for a way to advert the people’s attention.  His 
answer: reintroduce Shari’a law and designate his country a 
caliphate.  On September 23, 1983, Numeiri began his turn to 
Islam by pouring bottles of whiskey into the Nile River.29  Not 
only did this mark a new Islamic era within the Sudan, it also 
set the date for the second civil war.
Southern troops stationed at the southern city of Bor, as 
though it were 1955 all over again, mutinied after receiving 
orders to transfer north.  With the constant reshuffling of 
28 Johnson, Root Causes, 44.
29 Graham Thomas, Sudan 1950-1985: Death of a Dream (London: Darf 
Publishers Ltd., 1990) 198.
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presidents and governments, it proved difficult for Numeiri to 
learn from past mistakes.  In an attempt to quell the uprising, 
Khartoum requested John Garang, a member of the military, to 
mediate a surrender.  Bor, after all, was his hometown so he was 
a Southerner like them.  But there was just one problem; John 
Garang was a Southerner like them!  He joined the mutineers and 
managed to spread the uprising throughout most of the troops in 
the South.  Similar to the mutineers of 1955, these newest ex-
soldiers fled into the bush and joined the Anya Nya II rebels. 
This marriage proved unsuccessful and they fled further, mostly 
into Ethiopia where they received support from President 
Mengistu.  The resulting army and political operation was named 
the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A).30  Ethiopia 
provided massive amounts of support for the rebels, including 
artillery shells and air support for attacks on the North.  The 
SPLM/A grew rapidly, amassing 20,000 troops by 1985.
In 1985 the Sudan witnessed the demise of Numeiri as 
president.  The continuing war with John Garang and the SPLA 
coupled with mounting protests in the streets and multiple 
worker strikes brought the regime to its knees.  While on a 
state visit to Washington, Numeiri’s Defense Minister, Abd al-
Rahman Suwar al-Dhabab relieved Numeiri of duty and implemented 
another transitional government, the Transitional Military 
30 G. Norman Anderson, Sudan in Crisis (Gainesville: University Press of 
Florida, 1999) 70.
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Council (TMC).31  Having played a hand in Numeiri’s downfall, John 
Garang believed the new leadership would be willing to talk 
productively with the SPLM/A.  He received mixed messages from 
the government and the TMC did not attend the meetings.  
The National Alliance, however, did agree to meet with the 
SPLM at Koka Dam.  On March 26, 1986, both parties sat down and 
agreed to form a new Sudan, based on equal rights and an end to 
racism.  They also agreed to contact the National Islamic Front 
(NIF) and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) to obtain their 
agreement as well.  However, the National Alliance and SPLM 
disagreed on the issue of holding elections.  Garang did not 
want to hold any parliamentary elections prior to a new 
constitution, a process that could not begin without the NIF and 
the DUP, the primary members of the TMC.  
Far from wanting to sign any peace accords, total 
destruction of the SPLM consumed the NIF and Umma parties.  When 
the DUP finally signed an accord with the SPLM, the Umma-NIF 
majority blocked its approval through parliament.  The war 
continued to rage and, finally, officers forced the prime 
minister to decide on either gathering the force he needed to 
defeat the SPLM or negotiating with them.32  Al-Mahdi, leader of 
the Umma party, which held the largest block of seats in the 
TMC, and therefore prime minister of the TMC as well, chose the 
31 Lesch, Contested Identities, 62. 
32 Lesch, Contested Identities, 83 
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latter and accepted the DUP-SPLM Accord into a new government. 
Fearing a wane in power for the NIF, al-Mahdi attempted to end 
the cease-fire that the government and the SPLM had agreed to 
and suspend the accord between DUP and SPLM.  When it looked 
like neither of those would happen, the NIF staged a coup and 
Lt. General Umar Hasan Ahmad al-Beshir came to power in 1989, 
just days before Sadiq al-Mahdi was scheduled to meet Garang in 
Addis Ababa.  
As the civil war continued, the SPLM suffered multiple 
setbacks as many within SPLM lost confidence in John Garang as a 
leader.  The primary point of contention was Garang’s insistence 
on staying in Ethiopia and helping Mengistu with the Ethiopian 
civil war.  Many within the SPLM viewed Garang as a puppet of 
Mengistu.  Reik Machar and Lam Akol voiced this opinion and 
ultimately broke away to form their own wing of the SPLM.  War 
quickly broke out between the two factions, primarily fighting 
along lines of ethnicity; Garang’s SPLM was mostly Dinka while 
Machar’s SPLM was mostly Nuer.  This shift toward intra-South 
fighting brought war to the door steps of the civilian 
population.  SPLA-Nasir (led by Machar) accepted support from 
Khartoum in their struggle against Garang.  This allowed 
Khartoum to move about Nasir territory free from harm, giving 
them an upper hand in the South.33  
33 Johnson, Root Causes, 99.
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The first military success for the Garang’s SPLA (referred 
to merely as SPLA) in some time came in 1995-1996 when it 
launched a major offensive against government forces.  Most of 
the government’s advances from 1992 were rolled back.  The newly 
formed National Democratic Alliance (NDA) was integral to the 
SPLA’s success.  This new coalition was formed from both 
Northern and Southern opposition groups, encouraged by the other 
states in the region.  But, a crisis in leadership still loomed 
for the SPLA and the NDA.  A formal alliance between Khartoum 
and anti-Garang forces led to rebellion within the Southern 
forces and desertions to Garang’s SPLA.  This new success was 
short lived as the Ethiopian-Eritrean war cut off supplies and 
support to Garang’s forces.34  Khartoum had problems of its own as 
Beshir and Hasan al-Turabi, the leading scholar for the Islamist 
movement in the Sudan,35 fought each other for power.  Both 
attempted to garner al-Mahdi’s support from the NDA.  He did 
eventually return from exile and support Beshir.  Turabi was 
summarily imprisoned.  As al-Mahdi left the NDA it began to 
disintegrate, as did its coalition with the SPLA.36
An end to hostilities in the Sudan seems elusive, at best. 
The North-South civil war constitutes but one such war raging 
34 Johnson, Root Causes, 107.
35 Raghid El-Solh, “Islamist Attitudes towards Democracy: A Review of the 
Ideas of al-Ghazali, al-Turabi and 'Amara,” British Society for Middle 
Eastern Studies 20 (1993): 59.
36 Johnson, Root Causes, 108. 
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within the Sudan.  The peace initiatives of the twenty-first 
century are the first steps in a very long journey toward peace. 
The IGAD peace talks and Machakos Protocol are vital for the 
peace process but fairly insignificant as one side or both 
refuse to sign or obey them.  It seems self-determination for 
the South remains a pipe dream, considering Khartoum’s campaign 
sweeping through Darfur. 
The Sudan’s interminable violence has garnered 
international attention, reaching a fever pitch in the face of 
genocide in Darfur.  Although peace remains perpetually elusive, 
the United States Congress and U.S. television news outlets have 
continued to investigate the Sudan’s civil wars.  Although well 
intentioned, analysis emanating from Congress and news media 
remain confused and incomplete.  International peace efforts in 
the Sudan require a full understanding of the historical and 
political roots of the conflict if they are to ever work.
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CHAPTER 3
 OVER-SIMPLIFYING A COMPLEX CIVIL WAR
Simplifying this extremely nuanced and complex conflict 
into the paradigm of Muslim vs. Christians, or Arab vs. Black 
African, represents the most common impediment to understanding 
and resolving the Sudan's civil war.  Both the media and U.S. 
Congress are guilty of substituting the myriad causes of the war 
with its mere components.  While the second war had a greater 
degree of religious overtones, most scholars argue religion was 
not its major cause, and the first civil war had little, if any 
at all, to do with religion or race.  Indeed, geography and 
distribution of resources accounted for more fighting than any 
other reason.
The media fell into a pattern of presenting a superficial 
view of the Sudanese conflict when the second civil war began in 
the early 1980s after President Numeiri abrogated the Addis 
Ababa Peace Accords, effectively ending 10 years of relative 
peace.  President Jaafar Numeiri rose to power in the 1969 coup 
that ousted the parliamentary government of the previous five 
years.  He was part of a group that wanted a political end to 
the civil war rather than the military solution championed by 
preceding regimes in Khartoum.37  After ten years of peace, 
Numeiri made the politically expedient decision to institute 
37 Johnson, Root Causes, 36.
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Shari'a law as the basis for Sudanese law.  This was a far cry 
from his role as secularist at the beginning of his rule, and 
some say it resulted from a personal awakening, but, whatever 
the cause, it helped him to shore up support and placate some of 
the more radical Islamists in the North.38  Whether political 
expediency or personal revelation, it was this beginning to the 
second civil war that media outlets and members of Congress used 
to characterize the entire conflict.
The big three broadcast news networks, ABC, NBC, and CBS, 
did not cover the nascent Sudanese Civil War until 1985.  Up to 
that point their coverage of the Sudan focused on the famine and 
Sudan's relationship with its neighbors.  Still, as these news 
outlets began sending reporters to the Sudan, much of their 
reporting focused on the growing humanitarian crisis, an aspect 
of their coverage that is discussed later in this chapter.   
Although reports on the Sudan are few and far between, 1986 
proved a sort of watershed year for coverage on the Sudan.  In 
an August 24 NBC broadcast, Mike Wildrich reported from the 
Sudan that the civil war consisted of a Christian rebel movement 
fighting an insurgency against a Moslem government.39  Later, in 
a September 18 report, ABC used the same model for explaining 
the recent violence, informing the viewer that Arabs, mostly 
38 Lesch, Contested Identities, 54 
39 NBC Evening News, August 24 1986. This and all subsequent citations of 
TV news accounts are from the versions archived at Vanderbilt University.
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Muslim, were fighting Christians, mostly Africans.40  Not only 
did the second broadcast enter into the Muslim/Christian, 
African/Arab dichotomy, but the reporter also saw it acceptable 
to interchange Black Africans with Christians in their relation 
to Arabs (essentially showing that Arabs are all Muslim and that 
Black Africans are Christian and those terms are easily 
interchangeable).
The same two television news networks engaged in the 
simplification of the conflict in later reports as well.  In a 
November 30, 1988, report on mass starvation and the 
indifference of the leadership on all sides of the fighting, NBC 
news correspondent Jim Bitterman referred to the SPLA as 
"Christian rebels."41  In similar fashion, ABC broadcasts on 
December 5, 1988, and March 31, 1989, both focused on the level 
of Christian faith in the Sudanese refugees fleeing to Southwest 
Ethiopia.  In an attempt to position the two religions against 
each other, the refugees in the March 31, 1989, report were 
described as mostly Christian and in support of the Southern 
rebels against the Muslim North.42
In the 1990s, as the SPLA split and the Sudan endured even 
greater violence, the news agencies became more explicit in 
their coverage of the war.  In an ABC News report on April 22, 
40 ABC Evening News, September 28 1986.
41 NBC Evening News, November 30, 1988. 
42 CBS Evening News, December 5, 1988, and March 31, 1989.
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1993, Ron Allen, from location in the Sudan, tells viewers that 
the north of the Sudan is mostly Arab and Muslim, while the 
South is mostly African and Christian and that the civil war is 
a clash between the two religions/races.43  And this view 
prevails today, with a report as recent as a January 24, 2004, 
Fox Evening News segment in which the reporter pitted a Muslim 
government against Christian rebels.44   
In total, thirteen out of a total of forty-six television 
news broadcasts portrayed the Sudan's civil war as Arab vs. 
African or Muslim vs. Christian.  Although the number thirteen 
may seem small and insignificant, the other thirty-three 
broadcasts did not speak to the reasons for the civil war and 
the news reporters used the same paradigm throughout their 
respective news channel's years of coverage, demonstrating an 
engrained sense of understanding, however misplaced it may be.  
The members of the Congressional committees that 
investigated the civil war in the Sudan proved equally guilty of 
buying into the paradigm of Arab vs. Black and Muslim vs. 
Christian; members of Congress, Senators, and witnesses alike, 
with some exceptions, entered into this naïve way of viewing the 
Sudanese civil war.  Using a cross-section of Congressional 
hearings starting in 1984, this thesis delineates the attitudes 
and sentiments of U.S. legislators, and the experts they called 
43 ABC Evening News, April 22, 1993.
44 Fox Evening News, January 24, 2004.
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to testify. 
The scholars and government agents who testified as experts 
on the Sudan proved to be the only attendees of these hearings 
imploring the U.S. legislative bodies to look at the whole 
picture of Sudanese history when developing a strategy to end 
the civil war.  Indeed, many of the Congressional committee 
members who convened hearings on the civil war in Sudan 
commented on the war as though the first civil war had never 
happened.  In a March 28, 2001, Subcommittee on Africa hearing, 
Cynthia McKinney, of Georgia, referred to the "18 year old civil 
war"45 currently ravaging the country.  And she was far from the 
only one.  Eight years earlier, in a March 10, 1993, hearing, 
Frank Wolf stated that the "Islamic fundamentalist government 
has a clear history of intolerance of other religious groups," 
and that he was in agreement with a Southern Sudanese woman who 
believed Khartoum targeted Southerners because of their 
Christian beliefs.46  
At some points witnesses and Congressional members stated 
either falsehoods or wonderment at the facts on the ground in 
the Sudan.  At the same hearing as Cynthia McKinney in 2001, 
Representative Tom Tancredo, of Colorado, stated "it is true 
45 Rep. Cynthia McKinney, in United States Congress, House of 
Representatives, America’s Sudan Policy: A New Direction (Washington: United 
States Government Printing Office [hereafter USGPO] March 28, 2001) 6.
46 Rep. Frank Wolf, in United States Congress, House of Representatives, 
Recent Developments in the Sudan (Washington: US GPO, March 10, 1993) 3.
39
that you can look historically at the country of Sudan and say, 
well, there was a time when this population apparently lived 
together peacefully, but I think oil has changed everything."47  
Lois Richards, then Acting Assistant Administrator for Food and 
Humanitarian Assistance of the Agency for International 
Development, in the March 10, 1993, hearing expressed surprise 
at the fact that the Sudan had been at war with itself since 
early on in its independence: "I was reminded by a colleague of 
mine this morning who had served in the Sudan 27 years ago, that 
there was a civil war then between the North and the South."48  
Indeed, recognizing the breadth of misinformation and lack of 
knowledge on the parts of the other witnesses and members of 
congress, Robert O. Collins, at the same hearing as Ms. 
Richards, implored his audience to "remember that this war has 
been going on since 1965 with a ten year break from 1972 to 
1983, this is not something that just began a few years ago."49 
It would be naïve to argue that issues of religion and race 
were not significant facets to the struggle between the 
government in Khartoum and its combatants on the peripheries.  
But that does not mean that they are the most important factors 
or that solving these two issues will automatically bring peace.  
47 Rep. Tom Tancredo, in, America’s Sudan Policy, 20.  The oil he refers 
to is that discovered in the Southern regions of the Sudan.  Competition for 
resources and receipts for refinement of that oil is causing more strife 
between the government in Khartoum and Southerners.
48 Lois Richards, testimony in Recent Developments in the Sudan, 14.
49 Robert O. Collins, testimony in Recent Developments in the Sudan, 28.
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The underlying causes for the Sudan's second civil war reside in 
deep-seated hatred and mistrust that go back to the mid 1800s.  
Prior to the Turco-Egyptian regime, under the leadership of 
Muhammad Ali, Arabs of the North and Africans of the South had 
been separated by a large swamp area called the Sudd.  An 1839 
excursion South from Khartoum opened up the Sudd for the first 
time and allowed European and Arab traders and hunters to make 
fortunes in the newly exposed land.50  
Out of the Arab slave raids into the South emerged Southern 
hatred of and mistrust toward the North.  The people of the 
South identified themselves as African, even though they 
belonged to disparate tribes and ethnicities, and fought hard to 
keep their way of life.  The Arabs, on the other hand, used 
Islam to justify their raids and expeditions south and believed 
themselves validated in Arabicizing the entire region, a belief 
that persists even today.51  
The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium of the early 1900s put on 
hold the Arab efforts to penetrate deeper into the South and 
take total control.  The British discouraged interaction between 
the Arabs of the North and the Africans of the South and quite 
ably kept them apart.  After World War II the British granted 
the Sudan independence and began a process of unification 
50 Dunstan Wai, The African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan (New York, London: 
Africana Publishing Company, 1981), 27.
51 Wai, African-Arab Conflict, 29.  
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between the two regions.52  But by then the divisions had grown 
too deep.  The two regions had only a half century of 
interaction, and that based on exploitation of the South by the 
North.  Indeed, both civil wars can be better understood as a 
clash of nationalism, each side's nationalist views cultivated 
through its forced separation.  
Nationalism and nationalist identity are key factors in 
understanding the Sudan's civil wars.  Fighting has been over 
access to national and economic resources and "Sudan's conflict 
since its inception had more to do with political and economic 
hegemony than with ethnicity."53  An excellent example of this is 
the current conflict in Darfur, an offshoot of the second civil 
war.  There the media has mislabeled the combatants as “Arabs” 
and “Black Africans”, when in actuality members of the Darfurian 
political movements battling Khartoum "identify themselves as 
Arabs, Afro-Arabs, and Africans" and adhere to differing degrees 
of Islamic devotion.  The only thing they have in common is an 
"opposition to the policies of the government in Khartoum and 
their associated Militias."54
52 Charles Gurdon, Sudan at the Crossroads (Cambridgeshire, England: 
Middle East and North African Studies Press, Ltd., 1984), 12.
53 Khalid Mansur, War and Peace in Sudan: A Tale of Two Countries 
(London: Kegan Paul, 2003), 278.
54 Ruth Iyob and Gilbert Khadiagala, Sudan: The Elusive Quest for Peace 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006.), 66.
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CHAPTER 4
THE INTRA-SOUTH CIVIL WAR
Congress’ singular ability to simplify the Sudanese 
conflict did not limit itself to its favored dichotomy, Arab vs. 
African.  Congressional focus on this factual, yet ineffective, 
dichotomy took attention away from the inter- and intra-ethnic 
fighting in the South of the Sudan.  Long simmering under the 
surface, ethnic conflict came to a head in the 1990s as the SPLA 
split along ethnic lines.  A study of Congressional hearing 
transcripts demonstrates an overwhelming failure to completely 
understand the Southern cause.  Mention of ethnic violence is 
few and far between, with an in-touch few imploring their 
colleagues and congressmen to understand ethnic grievances as 
they relate to the peace process.  In contrast to television 
news, Congress seems extremely well-informed as TV news 
broadcasts failed to mention the growing ethnic violence 
altogether.  
Of the twelve Congressional hearing transcripts in this 
study, a paltry four hearings included testimony or questions 
directly related to the burgeoning ethnic strife in Southern 
Sudan.  Naturally, the preponderance of discussion rested 
primarily in the hearings of the mid-1990s as it became more and 
more obvious that ethnic violence, beyond that between Arabs and 
Africans, would become a permanent plague on the peace process. 
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Noel Koch, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
International Affairs, proved prescient in his analysis of the 
difficulties faced by the Sudan at the “Sudan: Problems and 
Prospects” hearing on March 28, 1984.  Although probably not 
cognizant of the implications of his words, he understood that 
the Sudan was beset by problems common to all developing 
nations; “economic difficulties, difficulties attending the 
national integration of disparate in-tribe national elements and 
infrastructural short-comings.”55  Koch deviated, however, from 
later analysis of ethnic violence because he was an official in 
an American presidential administration that supported President 
Numeiri.  Naturally, he did not see ethnic differences as a 
problem to be addressed, but rather a problem to be overcome in 
an attempt for Numeiri to rule effectively.
In the 1990s, as ethnic violence heated to a boil, experts 
and government officials addressed ethnicity as a problem to be 
solved in order to achieve a peace settlement acceptable to 
everyone.  Robert O. Collins, a historian and Sudanese expert 
from the University of California, Santa Barbara, represents the 
constant voice for understanding the Sudanese Conflict 
historically and holistically.  His testimony at the hearing 
“Recent Developments in Sudan,” on March 10, 1993, was 
buttressed with testimony from Lois Richards and Herman Cohen, 
55 Noel Koch, testimony in US Congress, House of Representatives, Sudan: 
Problems and Prospects (Washington: USGPO, March 28, 1984) 4.
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from the Agency for International Development and Assistant 
Secretary of State for African Affairs, respectively.  At the 
time, ethnic mobilization began to manifest itself and SPLM/A 
split into warring factions along ethnic lines.  This new 
wrinkle presented problems for delivering food and supplies to 
refugee camps and divided a tentatively united front for dealing 
with the government in Khartoum.  
As the situation in the Sudan grew steadily worse, the 
militarization of ethnic identity56, especially amongst the Nuer 
and Dinka, continued to solicit little discussion from 
Congressional committee members and witnesses.  The omnipresent 
Robert O. Collins was joined only by George Moose and Nelson 
Kasfir in discussing this new war in the South at the hearing 
“The Crisis in Sudan” on May 4, 1993.  Like most every other 
Congressional hearing on the Sudan, most of the discussion 
focused on the growing humanitarian disaster and the obstacles 
presented by the Sudanese government and rebel groups to 
delivering relief supplies.  It got to the point that Roger 
Winter, a veteran of multiple hearings on the Sudan, called for 
a more politically centered discussion of the conflict and 
believed “dwelling on the humanitarian can be an excuse, can 
draw attention from the need for clear, politically based 
56   Idea credited to Sharon Hutchinson, “Sudan’s Prolonged Second Civil 
War and the Militarization of Nuer and Dinka Ethnic Identities,” African 
Studies Review 42 (September 1999): 125-145.
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policy.”57  
Roger Winter was not the only American government official 
to observe the growing tension in the South of Sudan.  George 
Moose, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, 
understood the challenge of a fractured opposition in the South. 
He knew the Abuja Peace Conference of 1993 would never work 
because Khartoum and John Garang refused to allow for broader 
participation.  Indeed, Moose expressed concerns that resolving 
the intra-SPLA conflict would prove to be as vital to the peace 
process as ending the war between Khartoum and the SPLA. 
Nelson Kasfir, professor at Dartmouth University, seconded this 
very notion.  For Kasfir, a SPLA split resulted in reduced 
bargaining power because a single opposing force emanating from 
the South could have more easily forced the government of Sudan 
to reach a settlement.58  
As menacing as the incestuous war seemed, intra-SPLA 
fighting amounted to little more than a flash in the pan for 
both members of Congress and the experts testifying at their 
hearings.  A cross section of subsequent hearings saw that 
Congressional officials continued to call before them experts on 
refugees, humanitarian assistance, and slavery.  Politicians 
paid little attention to the historical roots to the conflict or 
57 Roger Winter, testimony in United States Congress, US Senate The 
Crisis in Sudan, (US Senate, May 4, 1993) 33.
58 Nelson Kasfir, testimony in The Crisis in Sudan, May 4, 1993, 24.
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to the fighting in the South.  Instead of a clear political 
discussion on how best to broker peace, the hearing was muddled 
by continued focus on the Muslim/Christian dichotomy, 
humanitarian assistance, and what it all means for the United 
States of America.  In the March 22, 1995, hearing, also 
entitled “The Crisis in Sudan,” Edward Brynn was the only person 
to communicate the urgency of ethnic fighting in the South. 
Even he could not resist the lure of religious terminology. 
While he established that the Sudan is comprised of multiple 
ethnic groups, he conceded that the historical divide was 
between a Muslim North and a Christian/Animist South.59  
The new millennium witnessed a drastic change in the 
dominant discussion on the Sudan at Congressional hearings.  The 
genocide in Darfur, which will be discussed in greater detail 
later, replaced religion, the humanitarian crisis in the South, 
and ethnic fighting as the dominant issue.  While the situation 
in Darfur focused much more attention on the Sudan, it 
distracted American policy makers from making a concerted effort 
to help the Sudan forge a lasting peace.  Donald Payne, 
Representative from New Jersey, went so far as to argue that 
addressing the root causes of the war represented the best path 
for an attainable peace.  He then pointed to oil, petrol-
dollars, as a key facilitator and cause of the war and the 
59 Edward Brynn, testimony in United States Congress, House of 
Representatives, The Crisis in Sudan, March 22, 1995, 8.
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genocide in Darfur, apparently believing the war started just 
recently and he is perhaps disingenuous in calling for a better 
understanding of the root causes.60  Cynthia McKinney, 
Representative from Georgia, furthered that same notion, 
pointing to the oil as a catalyst for the war and genocide.  The 
most egregious misunderstanding of the war, however, belongs to 
Tom Tancredo, representative from Colorado.  Mr. Tancredo 
claimed that “it is true you can look historically at the 
country of Sudan and say, well, there was a time when this 
population apparently lived together peacefully, but I think oil 
has changed everything.”61
The caveat that “oil has changed everything” implies that 
prior to the discovery of oil, the ethnic groups inhabiting the 
South of Sudan and the Arabs of the North got along peacefully, 
if not harmoniously.  This argument further implies that the 
second civil war existed independent of the first and fails to 
take into account violence before, and irrespective to, the 
discovery of oil.
The primary impetus for the largely invisible conflict in 
the South was a clash of ideology, a “war of visions.”62  Congress 
and television news reports focused so intently on ascribing a 
60 Rep. Donald Payne, in America's Sudan policy : a new direction?, 5
61 Rep. Tom Tancredo, in America’s Sudan Policy: a new direction?, 20
62 A term coined by Francis Deng in describing the difficulty of creating 
an encompassing plan for Southern Sudan; see his book of the same name, War 
of Visions (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995).
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grand narrative for the war, between North/South, Arab/African, 
Muslim/Christian, they failed to see the smaller wars brewing in 
other parts of the country.  An ironic take on an arboreal 
expression, Congress and TV news reporters failed to see the 
trees for the forest.  Congress’ and TV news media’s failure to 
understand the political dynamics of the South led to their 
bewilderment at the onset of intra-South conflict, limiting 
their ability to report accurately, or at all as was seen in 
this case, or provide effective assistance.  
The primary ethnicity, that is the ethnicity with the most 
power within the state, is Arab, which makes up roughly 40 
percent of the population.  The Islamists, who are a part of the 
Arab identity, control the government and lead the fight against 
Southern rebels.  Ann Mosely Lesch, Sudanese expert, categorizes 
the Islamist government as belonging to the Control Model, where 
“the state tries to undermine and even destroy other ethnic 
national groups that exist within its boundaries, whether by 
assimilation or repression.”63 It is within this context that the 
Nuer and Dinka find themselves, leading the South against a 
repressive Islamist government and, since the eruption of inter-
ethnic violence within the South, against each other.  The 
Southern ethnic groups, especially those fighting Khartoum, 
identify themselves as African and view the Arabs of the North 
63 Lesch, Contested Identities, 9.
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as the enemy.
Competition for natural, not political, resources define 
the historical relationship between ethnic groups in Southern 
Sudan.  A heavy reliance on cattle caused conflict between 
migrating tribes over grazing land and intricate bride-wealth 
systems.  In the eighteenth century the Nuer were the most 
aggressive tribes in Southern Sudan.  Their bride-wealth system, 
where the bride’s family receives cattle from the groom’s family 
as payment for the woman‘s lost services, could require a 
groom’s family to relinquish as much as forty head of cattle. 
The sheer cost, then, of marriage required Nuer families to 
maintain large herds of cattle, prompting them to seek huge 
swaths of land that brought them into direct competition with 
other cattle herding tribes.64  Arab slave raids had the same 
effect.  Nuer fleeing east from Arab slavers conquered the 
tribes who put up resistance, mostly Dinka, and assimilated them 
into their groups.  Indeed, the Nuer populations “increased 
fourfold” during this period.65
The first half of the twentieth century saw a marked 
decrease in the relative violence between Nuer and Dinka.  The 
reasons can be traced back to the Turco-Egyptian rule from 1821-
64 Raymond C. Kelly, The Nuer Conquest: The Structure and Development of 
an Expansionist System (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1985) 117.
65 Stephanie Beswick, Sudan’s Blood Memory: The Legacy of War, Ethnicity 
and Slavery in Early South Sudan ( Rochester , NY : University of Rochester 
Press , 2004) 174.
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1885, better known as the Turkiyya.  This period saw a massive 
increase in slave raids on the African tribes of the Sudan as 
Arabs needed workers and soldiers.  The Turkiyya ended Dinka 
dominance in the South and preoccupation between ethnic groups.  
“Now, externally generated traumas would equally, although not 
exclusively, consume the lives of Southern people.”66  Douglas 
Johnson made note of the same phenomena; “Eastern Jikany (Nuer) 
quickly changed from being harassers of the Northern Dinka to 
becoming their protectors against Turco-Egyptian raids.”67  
The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium from 1898-1952 was the 
greatest period of calm between the Nuer and Dinka.  Under the 
“Nuer Settlement Policy” of the 1920s and 1930s, Nuer were 
separated from their Dinka neighbors.  It was part of a 
“pacification campaign” by the British against the Nuer.68  The 
new laws forbade the Nuer from raiding cattle from other tribes 
and created a no man’s land between the Nuer and Dinka.  The 
British abrogated this policy in 1936 and drew up plans to merge 
the Nuer and Dinka tribes into a single political unit.  All of 
this was under the umbrella of the Southern Policy, enacted in 
1930 to stem the violence in Southern Sudan, pacify all of the 
peoples, and stop Arabs from taking advantage of the lesser 
66 Beswick, Sudan’s Memory, 195
67 Johnson, Root Causes, 186.
68 Sharon Hutchinson, Nuer Dilemmas: Coping with Money, War and the 
State (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 115.
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developed Southerners economically.69 The British abrogated the 
plan for cohesion along with its Southern Policy in favor of 
Sudanese unity in preparation for independence.  
The separation became a problem when the British did not 
attempt to increase infrastructure and development within the 
South to compete with the North. There were too few schools to 
educate and train the people and no government secondary schools 
to create a politically astute class of civil servants.  
Ann Mosely Lesch illustrates the disparity between the 
North and South economies by analyzing the per capita gross 
domestic product in 1956; people living in greater Khartoum 
earned 119 Sudanese Pounds whereas people living in the three 
Southern provinces earned only twelve Sudanese Pounds.70  The 
effects of the Southern Policy were compounded by its sudden 
abandonment “on the eve of the imperial withdrawal.”  Dunstan 
Wai opines that the real “crime” against the Southerners was not 
in the Southern Policy‘s adoption, for he thinks it was the 
right policy, but was “its abandonment and the political 
unification of the two disparate regions.”71 
Southern Sudanese politics after independence revolved 
around the issue of secession from, or unity with, the Arab 
69 Wai, Southern Sudan, 14-15.
70 Lesch, Contested Identities, 33.
71 Dunstan Wai, “Pax Britannica and the Southern Sudan: The View from the 
Theatre,” African Affairs 79 (July, 1980): 375.
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government seated in Khartoum.  During the first civil war, from 
1955 to 1972, there was more or less a pan-African feel to the 
movement; mass cooperation between many of the ethnic groups 
supplanted inter-ethnic violence.  Allan Reed, who spent ten 
months with Anya Nya forces in 1971, saw a great deal of inter-
ethnic cooperation.  He commented on the ease with which Dinka 
troops traveled through historically non-Dinka territory and 
concluded that “there is a genuine Southern Sudanese nationalism 
now that crosses over tribal boundaries.”72  The Anya Nya 
themselves did not make a point to distinguish between 
ethnicities relative to the total war effort.  According to the 
Anya Nya, it was “fighting for freedom for the people of 
Southern Sudan-freedom to determine their own cultural, 
religious and linguistic character.  Freedom to be African.”73  
The Addis Ababa Peace Agreement, signed in 1972 in 
Ethiopia, ushered in an eleven-year period of uneasy peace and 
ceasefire.  The South was granted regional autonomy and it 
looked as though there would be the chance for a referendum on 
Southern self-determination.  Those hopes were dashed when 
President Jafaar Numeiri, the same man who brought the 
belligerents to the peace table, abrogated the peace agreement 
72 Allan Reed, “The Anya Nya: Ten Month’s Travel with its Forces Inside 
the Southern Sudan,” Munger Africana Library Notes 11 (Feb.,1972): 20.
73 The Anya Nya, The Anya Nya Struggle: Background and Objectives (South 
Sudan: South Sudan Resistance Movement, 1970[?])distributed by The Grass 
Curtain, a newsletter published by the Anya Nya in London, England. 
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by instituting Shari’a Law in the North.  Islamization and 
Arabization were renewed as policies for the government and 
Southern militias took up arms once again to defend against what 
they saw as Arab domination.  More important was the ethnic 
violence, primarily amongst Nuer and between Nuer and Dinka, 
that became a part of the second civil war in the late 1980s.    
The 1980s saw a drastic increase in Nuer on Nuer violence, 
primarily consisting of spear attacks between close kinsmen.  
But Nuer fighting Nuer was nothing new.  The 19th century was 
rife with intra-Nuer violence.  Compensation for homicide was 
similar to bride payment and acted as a “redistributive 
mechanism” for cattle.74  The new ethnic violence during the 
second civil war hardened ethnic identities and fractured an 
already fragile commitment between the parties to fight the 
North.  
Intra-South violence prior to 1991 paled in comparison to 
the destruction wrought by the split in the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement/Army (SPLA).  It is difficult to ascertain 
the exact role of ethnicity in causing the SPLA split.  Riek 
Machar and Lam Akol were the leaders of the breakaway faction 
SPLA-Nasir.  Machar was a native Nuer and most of the 
militarized Nuer simply followed him into the new SPLA.  This 
left the Dinka to stay with their fellow tribesman, John Garang.  
74 Kelly, Nuer Conquest, 115.
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“Confined to the highest ranks of the SPLA leadership, this 
political rift soon sparked off a full-scale military 
confrontation between the two largest ethnic groups in the 
South, the Dinka and Nuer.”75  
It proved tough for non-Dinka members of the political 
class to overlook John Garang’s dictatorial style.  Many, both 
inside and outside the rebel movement, perceived the SPLA “as a 
Dinka movement inspired by traditional Dinka concerns and 
aspirations.”76  Joseph Lagu, former commander of Anya Nya 
forces, accused the Dinka of dominating the SPLA and paying 
little regard to other ethnic groups.77  Political aims were also 
a point of divisiveness.  Lam Akol “persuaded Riek Machar to 
support secession and try to overthrow Garang,”78 who wanted to 
keep the North and South unified.  The lack of democratization 
within SPLA ranks and a clear split in political ideology 
precipitated “personal grievances and rivalries that had been 
brewing over a period of time” that could not be overcome 
through diplomacy.79  
The conflict between the disparate ethnicities of the 
75 Sharon Hutchinson, “A Curse from God? Religious and Political 
Dimensions of the post-1991 Rise of Ethnic Violence in South Sudan,” The 
Journal of Modern African Studies 39 (June 2001): 308.
76 M.A. Mohamed Salih, “The Ideology of the Dinka and the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement,” in Ethnicity and Conflict in the Horn of Africa, edited 
by Katsuyoshi Fukui and John Markakis (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 
1994), 198. 
77 Joseph, Lagu, Decentralization: A Necessity for the Southern 
Provinces of the Sudan (Khartoum: Samar P. Press, 1981), 63.
78 Lesch, Contested Identities, 157.
79 Deng, War of Visions, 230.
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South, especially the Nuer and Dinka, devolved into a brutal 
tit-for-tat.  While the breakaway SPLA factions decried Garang’s 
human rights abuses and lack of democracy, ironically, they did 
not seem to mind committing human rights atrocities of their 
own.  In one particular response to a Nuer raid against a Dinka 
village, a Dinka officer rounded up unsuspecting Nuer civilians 
and executed them.80 
Intra-ethnic fighting in Southern Sudan further complicated 
U.S. Congressional and media attempts at understanding and 
describing the civil war. In the 1980s Congressional members and 
media reporters overlooked the ethnic fighting in favor of a 
focus on Cold War politics.  United States politicians viewed 
the Sudan as a possible ally in the Cold War and constructed 
foreign policy around political expediency.  The end of the Cold 
War allowed members of Congress and the media to shed Cold War 
paradigms, but they instead focused on the humanitarian issues 
instead of a political solution to the fighting, both in the 
South and the larger civil war.
80 Hutchinson, “Curse from God?,” 318.
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CHAPTER 5
COLD WAR POLITICS
The Sudan’s second civil war presents a significant case 
study in Cold War politics as it relates to United States’ 
foreign policy.  The second war began in the early 1980s after 
President Numeiri abrogated the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement and 
re-implemented Shari’a law, angering non-Muslim Southerners on 
both accounts.  At its onset U.S. policy makers experienced 
confusion in creating a monolithic U.S. policy toward the 
escalating civil war.  Numeiri was an ally to the West, with his 
fight against communists in his own country, while the Sudan 
occupied an important geo-strategic position along the Red Sea, 
a possible gateway between the Arab World and Black Africa. 
Attitudes toward Numeiri and the Southern opposition were 
redefined, effectively switched, and policy positions hardened 
as the Cold War ended, allowing for a more objective approach to 
understanding the conflict.
   The most effective way to demonstrate the Cold War 
paradigm lies in how Congress and television news broadcasts 
portray the two central organizations in this tragedy, the Sudan 
People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and the government of Sudan 
(Khartoum).  This study will use the year 1992 as the break 
point for reporters and congressional officials no longer using 
the Cold War paradigm to analyze the Sudanese conflict.  
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In the 1980s, with the Cold War still dominating foreign 
policy considerations, news coverage of the Sudan seemed 
slightly confused.  While television reporters made it clear 
that both sides were to blame for the growing humanitarian 
disaster, they found it difficult to assign one side the role of 
villain.  But with Cold War terminology so prevalent, issues of 
national sovereignty reigned supreme rendering rebellion a 
nuisance in need of suppression.  It is in this light that 
television news coverage portrayed the SPLA and Khartoum. 
Khartoum’s position as an ally in America’s fight against 
communism also helped in assigning judgment between the SPLA and 
the government of Sudan.
In the period between 1983 and 1992, television news 
networks covered some aspect of the Sudanese conflict twenty-two 
times.  In the early years of the civil war the media covered 
Sudan’s political machinations as they related to U.S. foreign 
policy.  Sudan borders both Libya and Ethiopia, two countries 
that at that time enjoyed strong ties to the Soviet Union.  Not 
unexpectedly, American coverage of the Sudan slanted toward 
these issues.  In the late seventies and early eighties, 
political coverage of the Sudan centered on President Numeiri’s 
expulsion of Soviet advisers following the Sudan communist 
party’s short-lived coup.  The news outlets clearly placed 
Numeiri and the Sudan in the camp of the United States and the 
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West, a de facto friend of America.  Before the rebellion began 
in earnest, coverage of Southern rebels kidnapping American 
missionaries and their subsequent rescue by Sudanese troops 
squarely put Southern demands and military excursions at odds 
with American sentiment.
After the war started, coverage shifted toward the nascent 
humanitarian disaster throughout Sudan.  Ten of the twenty-two 
news segments covering the Sudanese conflict depicted the SPLA 
as the main obstacle to peace and prosperity, mostly due to 
their hindering of relief supplies.  Famine and drought ravaged 
the country and humanitarian assistance dominated the coverage. 
Reporters credited the SPLA with shooting down relief planes, 
threatening further attacks on relief efforts, and open 
rebellion against the government.  While all those claims were 
true, and reports often claimed that both sides were to blame 
for the famine and death, little coverage was given to 
Khartoum’s complicity in perpetuating the war and its use of 
food as a weapon.  Of the twenty-two new segments between 1983 
and 1992, not a single report explicitly blamed the government 
of Khartoum for waging a religious/ethnic war against non-
Muslims and Africans in the South.  Although a few made it clear 
that there existed animosity between a Muslim government and a 
non-Muslim South, that line of thought was never fully fleshed 
out and the viewer was left with an incomplete picture.  
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From 1992 to 2007 television news networks covered the 
Sudan twenty-eight times, invariably focusing on the 
humanitarian relief efforts.  However, because the Cold War had 
ended, news reporters gained a clearer sense of how to assess 
blame and freed themselves from the Cold War paradigm.  Of the 
twenty-eight segments, six of them clearly portrayed the 
Khartoum government as the villain, with only one assigning the 
SPLA to that role.81  Notice that neither time period contained a 
news segment that depicted the SPLA nor the government of the 
Sudan as the protagonist, i.e. nobody is good.  In those 
segments that do not assign blame, they are fully devoted to the 
economic and humanitarian crises.  
United States’ Congressional hearings demonstrate the 
clearest transformation from Cold War politics to a more 
altruistic based foreign policy toward the Sudan.  Discussions 
about the geo-strategic importance of the Sudan dominated 
Congressional hearings in the 1980s.  Situated along the Red Sea 
and its close proximity to both the Arab world and Black Africa, 
the Sudan presented prime real estate for Cold War political 
maneuvering.  The ability to control the Red Sea, with its 
importance as a trade route from the Mediterranean Sea to the 
Indian Ocean, presented an opportunity gain the upper hand 
against the Soviet Union.  A 1982 staff report, compiled for, 
81 CBS Evening News, December 23, 1992.
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but not necessarily the views of, the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, concluded that the Sudan “is politically and 
strategically important to the United States,” with important 
borders with Libya and “communist Ethiopia.”82
In a 1981 hearing, “Libya-Sudan-Chad Triangle,” 
Representative Howard Wolpe expressed the concern of “many 
Americans [that] Libya will exploit political strains in 
Northern Africa in order to foster political change that would 
be detrimental to American interest” following the assassination 
of Anwar al Sadat, president of Egypt.83  To shore up further 
western support within the Sudan, Wolpe went on to float the 
idea of more economic aid in addition to the military support 
already allocated.  Presiding over another hearing on the Sudan 
in 1984, “Sudan: Problems and Prospects,” Wolpe delineated 
American support for the Sudan; twenty to twenty-five percent of 
African Aid goes to the Sudan, with American planes patrolling 
Sudanese skies to deter Libyan attacks.84  
At that same 1984 hearing, Noel Koch, Deputy assistant 
Secretary of State for International Security Affairs, pointed 
to the same outside agitators, Libya and Ethiopia, and seconded 
the opinion that Sudan “occupies a critical position on the 
82 Lewis Gulick and Stephen D. Nelson, United States Economic Assistance 
to Egypt and Sudan (Washington: US GPO, 1982) 39.
83  Representative Howard Wolpe, in US Congress, House of 
Representatives, Libya-Sudan-Chad Triangle (Washington: US GPO, October 29, 
1981).
84 Representative Howard Wolpe, in Sudan: Problems and Prospects, pg #
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African continent.”85  Princeton Lyman, Deputy assistant Secretary 
of State for African Affairs, best summed up the official 
government attitude for the Reagan Administration: “President 
Numeiri shares major U.S. objectives in the region, countering 
Soviet influence in the Arab World and Africa.”86  Unable to look 
beyond Cold War politics, both Lyman and Koch went on to 
congratulate President Numeiri for ending the first civil war in 
1972 and touted the value of America’s friendship with the 
Sudan.  
In 1989, a few years into the second civil war, attempts to 
define the SPLA as anathema to the goals of both the United 
States and Sudan picked up in earnest.  In the March 2, 1989, 
hearing, “Politics of Hunger in the Sudan,” Representative 
Howard Wolpe used the term “Southern insurgents” in reference to 
the SPLA87 and Kenneth Brown, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 
for African Affairs, reemphasized America’s long standing 
friendship with Khartoum.  In a bit of unintended irony, Brown 
asserted that the United States “will continue to seek an end to 
external interference in Sudan,”88 implying Ethiopia and Russia 
while not realizing he could just as easily be referring to the 
United States.
85 Noel Koch, testimony in Sudan: Problems and Prospects,4 
86 Princeton Lyman, testimony in Sudan: Problems and Prospects, 18   
87 Representative Howard Wolpe, in US Congress, House of Representatives, 
Politics of Hunger in the Sudan (Washington: US GPO, March 2, 1989) 1
88 Kenneth Brown, testimony in Politics of Hunger in the Sudan, 23.
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Robert O. Collins and Roger Winter, among others, noticed 
the underlying current of Congressional members’ animosity for 
the SPLA and overly friendly attitudes toward Khartoum.  In 1981 
Collins considered it a “very serious mistake” to place Khartoum 
in either camp vis-à-vis the Cold War, citing its inconsistent 
foreign policies.  He cited economic problems as the major 
obstacle to Sudanese viability and rejected as “detrimental” 
large military aid packages from the U.S. to the Sudan.89  Douglas 
Johnson, another historian and Sudanese expert, in 1984 ventured 
that Khartoum would use Cold War politics to garner U.S. 
assistance and that Numeiri was bent on establishing an Islamic 
state within the Sudan.90  Roger Winter in 1989 was more explicit. 
He rejected the notion that the SPLA is America’s enemy simply 
because it is backed by Ethiopia, an ally of the USSR.  Instead, 
he called for rethinking U.S.’s relationship with Khartoum, 
citing that most of the starvation has occurred in government 
controlled areas.91  At the same hearing, a point of ironic levity 
elicited derisive laughter from the audience after Kenneth Brown 
assured the panel that the United States would guarantee that 
Khartoum would not use American military equipment in the 
South.92
Congressional inquiries on the Sudan shifted from issues of 
89 Robert O. Collins, testimony in Libya-Sudan-Chad Triangle, 4.
90 Douglas Johnson, testimony in Sudan: Problems and Prospects, 44. 
91 Roger Winter, testimony in Politics of Hunger in Sudan, 15.
92 Kenneth Brown, testimony in Politics of Hunger in the Sudan, 24.
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American hegemony in a bi-super power world to human rights and 
combating terrorism following the end of the Cold War.  The 
United States no longer needed an ally in a theoretical war 
against the Soviet Union.  That fact alone allowed U.S. policy 
makers to shift their attention from “what can the Sudan do for 
America?” to “what should America be doing for the Sudan?”  With 
this new attitude came a much more critical view of the Sudanese 
government.  
George Moose clearly defined the growing sentiment in the 
United States toward the Sudan at the May 4, 1993, hearing “The 
Crisis in Sudan”; “America’s values do not permit us to sit idly 
by while civil war rages and human rights are systematically 
abused.”93  At the same hearing James Kunder, a veteran of various 
U.S. government and nongovernmental Aid organizations, points 
out that the Sudan is fully one-third the size of the United 
States.  Understanding that the Sudan is a large swath of land, 
Kunder makes it clear that many obstacles stand in the way of 
effectively delivering aid.  In addition to logistical 
hindrances, many Sudanese were quite averse to foreign aid 
workers.94  Noting that the situation in the Sudan had remained 
static, Roger Winter believed that the U.S. had no clear policy 
toward the Sudan other than waiting and watching.95  But more 
93 George Moose, testimony in United States Congress, Senate, The Crisis 
in Sudan (Washington: USGPO, May 4, 1993) 2.
94 James Kunder, testimony in Crisis in Sudan, 10.
95 Roger Winter, testimony in Senate The Crisis in Sudan, 33. 
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important than what was said is what was not said.  In no 
question or answer did participants discuss the geo-strategic 
importance of the Sudan.  Indeed, participants geared much of 
the discussion to the humanitarian disaster and possibilities 
for United States’ help; “the overriding American interest is 
the suffering of innocent people.”96  
Although U.S. policy makers and experts viewed secular 
governments as benign in themselves, many became alarmed with 
Khartoum’s campaign of forced Islamization in the South, its 
support for Islamic terrorist organizations, and its harboring 
of international terrorists, most notably Osama bin Laden.  With 
the threat of terrorism, the hearing concerning “The Crisis in 
Sudan” on March 22, 1995, saw a reversion to a more selfish 
foreign policy, but one borne out of self-preservation and not 
the perpetuation of American hegemony.  Representative Ileana 
Ros-Lehtinen believed Khartoum’s support for insurgency groups 
and international terrorists presented enough of a reason to no 
longer view the Sudan as primarily a humanitarian issue but as a 
threat to U.S. security.97  Clearly, Khartoum was no longer the 
friend to the United States it was during the Cold War.
As the United States became less and less enthralled with 
Khartoum’s politics, members of Congress and witnesses shifted 
96 Melissa Wells, testimony in House of Representatives, Crisis in Sudan 
(March 22, 1995), 20.
97 Rep, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, in House of Representatives, Crisis in 
Sudan (March 22, 1995), 1.
65
toward a friendlier attitude with regard to the SPLA and other 
opposition groups.  The most glaring reversal of opinion on the 
SPLA arose between Kenneth Brown, Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
State for Africa in the Bush Administration (1989), and John 
Prendergast, a Sudanese expert in the Clinton Administration. 
In 1989 Kenneth Brown testified that a cease fire was an 
integral part to any peace agreement and military gains by the 
SPLA undermined any chance for peace negotiations.98  In 1995 
Prendergast directly contradicted Brown’s statements.  Lamenting 
the SPLA split, Prendergast testified that Khartoum would not 
negotiate a peace settlement unless there was another stalemate 
that was unlikely with a disunited opposition.99  This 
disagreement clearly demonstrates the reversal of attitudes 
toward Khartoum and the SPLA, from an earlier U.S. official 
calling for the SPLA to stop fighting to a later U.S. official 
calling for a stronger Southern opposition.  
If the 1990s saw a more critical American view of Khartoum, 
the new millennium saw Khartoum’s complete vilification.  The 
genocide in Darfur dominated Congressional discussion.  One 
needs to look no further than the Congressional hearing titles 
to understand the topic of discussion: “Consolidating Peace 
While Confronting Genocide”; “Darfur Peace and Accountability 
98 Kenneth Brown, testimony in Politics of Hunger in the Sudan (March 22, 
1995), 91.
99 John Prendergast, testimony in House of Representatives, Crisis in 
Sudan (March 22,1995), 26.
66
Act”; and “The Current Situation in Sudan and Prospects for 
Peace.”  Without exception, experts and members of congress 
alike portrayed Khartoum as the uber-villain bent on wiping out 
a whole population.  The genocide is covered in the concluding 
chapter, and the monolithic condemnation of Khartoum throughout 
the Congressional hearings since the genocide started renders an 
explanation of nuance here pointless.  For these hearings, 
Khartoum was evil and any opposition seemed heroic.  
67
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
Failure to understand the myriad nuances and idiosyncrasies 
of the Sudanese civil wars has bedeviled the U.S. Congress and 
television news outlets alike.  Falling victim to 
oversimplification, reporters and congressional representatives 
used tired clichés in explaining complex and sometimes 
contradictory attitudes between the combatants.  Often, they 
would either use ineffectual dichotomies left over from the 
first civil war to explain the second, or fail to grasp nascent 
rivalries that proved prevalent in the second, such as the 
Muslim/Christian dichotomy in the former and the intra-South 
fighting in the latter.  As for the Cold War, it seems they did 
not realize they were engaging in Cold War paradigms while 
reporting on and investigating the Sudan.  
While many members of congress as well as television 
reporters embraced the Sudan with good intentions, it became 
painfully obvious that they focused on aspects of the war that 
had little to do with its resolution.  The overwhelming majority 
of news reports and Congressional discussions dealt primarily 
with the humanitarian crisis and did little to contribute to 
finding a political solution.  Some of the experts testifying 
before Congress understood this problem and informed the 
respective committees.  
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Delivering relief supplies to those in need became a 
struggle in itself for the relief agencies working in the Sudan. 
With no political solution in sight, relief organizations 
battled Khartoum and the SPLA for access to refugees in their 
respectively held areas.  It turned into a major point of 
contention in 1986 when the SPLA shot down a plane carrying 
relief to Sudanese citizens.100  Following the attack, the SPLA 
vowed to shoot down any plane flying over their territory based 
on the belief that the planes carried supplies to Northern 
soldiers.  Naturally, the relief agencies denied the accusation, 
but little came of it.  Politics and military strategy proved to 
be the largest impediments to relief work.  
Reporters sent to cover the Sudan quickly realized that 
much of the food and supplies devoted to starving citizens sat 
in hangers and on tarmacs waiting for a politically stable 
window to begin airlifts.  To their credit, the news coverage 
highlighted the reality that Khartoum and the SPLA were using 
food relief as a weapon.  By not allowing relief supplies to go 
through, each side could curtail the other’s willingness to 
fight.  However, the people suffering the most continued to be 
the innocent civilians.  In a war full of ironies, the most 
brutal was the fact that some starving people were so hungry 
they could not physically eat.  Even if relief got there, it was 
100 ABC evening news, September 18, 1986.
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often too late.  
The focus of Congressional hearings and television news on 
the humanitarian aspect of the brutal conflict persisted well 
into the twenty-first century.  The newest conflict to suffer 
from this acute lack of understanding is the genocide in Darfur. 
Although the international community, most notably the United 
Nations and the United States, officially recognized the 
violence in Darfur as genocide, little has been done to rid the 
area of the systemic violence that has plagued the area since 
the beginning of the twenty-first century.  Like the civil wars 
before it, the genocide in Darfur will only end with a political 
solution.  As the Sudan creeps ever closer to a new civil war, 
and violence begins to dominate the landscape again, the need 
for a political solution to the Sudan’s ills has never been 
greater.
Darfur is the commonly used name for the area of western 
Sudan that was once dominated by the Fur people101, encompassing 
about 508,000 square kilometers.102   Fur allegiance to the Nile 
River area, modern day Sudan, resulted from fuqura evangelism in 
Darfur.  Fuqura, “holy men from the Nile,” converted the Fur to 
Islam, instilling a deep devotion in the Fur to Islam and the 
101 E. G. Sarsfield-Hall, “Darfur,” The Geographical Journal 60 
(November, 1922): 359.
102 Agnes van Ardenne, Mohamed Salih, Nick Grono, and Juan Mendez, 
Explaining Darfur: Lectures on the Ongoing Genocide (Amsterdam: Amsterdam 
University Press, 2006), 10.
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Nile region.  The Fur sultan Muhammed Tayrab extended the 
kingdom to the Nile valley in 1787, conquering the lesser 
sultanates in his way and engaged in the international trade of 
the period.103  
The British incorporated Darfur into the greater Anglo-
Egyptian Condominium in 1916.  Now a part of the Sudan, the 
British implemented indirect rule, resulting in what Gerard 
Prunier calls “colonial benign neglect.”104  Claiming a respect 
for native authority, British authorities divided the region 
into small areas of personal rule by local chiefs.  Local chiefs 
and Condominium authorities alike did little to advance 
education or economic infrastructure in the region.  Shielded 
from the rest of the Sudan for its entire Condominium life, 
Darfur was ill-prepared for incorporation into a new, 
independent state when the Sudan gained independence in 1956.105
Like Southern Sudan, Darfur received little assistance or 
attention from Khartoum.  Following World War II Darfur received 
even less attention as international organizations and foreign 
nations pumped money into Southern Sudan.  Darfur grew even more 
distrustful of Khartoum.  The drought of the 1960s exacerbated 
the already established tensions between Darfur and the more 
103 J Millard Burr and Robert O. Collins, Darfur: A Long Road to Disaster 
(Princeton: Markus Weiner Publishers, 2008), 17.
104 Gerard Prunier, Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2005, 2007), 25.
105 Prunier, Darfur, 25. 
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urban areas.  The wells built by the Sudanese government to 
combat the drought added to the problem.  The water supply 
attracted herds of camel and nomads with their own cattle in 
search of water.  The traditional farmers of Darfur turned into 
shepherds as only small shrubbery would now grow in their 
fields.  Competition between nomads, with their herds, and 
Darfurian shepherds occasionally turned violent, reviving long 
simmering rivalries.106
In 1975 the rains came back.  They did not last.  In 1982 
the drought resumed in earnest and spread from the Red Sea to 
the Atlantic Ocean.  To make matters worse, Numeiri’s 
politically expedient conversion to Islam and imposition of 
Shari’a law precipitated more rebellion throughout the South, 
leading to the second civil war.  The transitional government 
that replaced President Numeiri in 1986 did little to mitigate 
the rising tide of mistrust between the periphery and the 
center.  Shari’a law continued unabated and the National Islamic 
Front under General Omar el Beshir took power in 1989.  Khartoum 
hoped to kill two birds with one stone by giving arms to 
militias in Darfur to use against Southern rebels.  Tribes in 
Darfur have a long history of antagonism with Southern tribes, 
which Khartoum hoped to capitalize on.107  
106 Burr and Collins, Darfur, 65.
107 Molly J. Miller, “The Crisis in Darfur,” Mediterranean Quarterly 18.4 
(2007): 112-130, 120.
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The combination of drought, which led to greater 
competition for resources, and hardened ethnic identity led to 
open hostility between Arab militias and the native tribes of 
Darfur.  Under the guise of “deep seated tribal conflict,” 
Khartoum prosecuted a proxy war against rebelling Darfurians 
using Arab militias.108  In the early 1990s the NIF government 
began the violent process of cleansing the Darfur region of non-
Arab ethnicities, primarily the Fur.  What was once the natural 
outcome of competition for resources, violence in Darfur became 
a state-sponsored enterprise with a racist ideology.109  
Two non-Arab political groups formed in 2003 avowing armed 
conflict against the NIF government to gain political autonomy 
and an equitable wealth-sharing agreement for Darfur; Sudan 
Liberation Army (SLA) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM).110 
Unable and unwilling to transfer troops from the South, Khartoum 
instead fostered its relationship with Janjaweed, a 
heterogeneous Arab-militia comprised of “former bandits and 
highway men who had been in the trade, since the 1980s; 
demobilized soldiers from the regular army; young members of 
Arab tribes having a running land conflict with a neighboring 
‘African’ group-most appeared to be members of the smaller Arab 
108 Miller, “Crisis in Darfur,” 123.
109 Mahgoub El-Tigani Mahmoud, “Inside Darfur: Ethnic Genocide by a 
Governance Crisis,” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle 
East 24.2 (2004): 5.
110 Mahmoud, “Inside Darfur,” 6. 
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tribes; common criminals who were pardoned and released from 
gaol if they joined the militia; fanatical members of the 
Tajammu al-Arabi; and young unemployed ‘Arab’ men.”111
The genocide in Darfur continues, unabated, through today. 
The major obstacle to peace seems to be convincing the primary 
actors that peace can actually work.  The SLA and JEM embraced 
violence as their last resort, rendering it difficult to accept 
any other option.112  Darfur’s violence has a long history and 
cannot be separated from the civil war at large.  Its roots lie 
in the same fertile ground that produced the Sudan’s civil wars; 
namely the precipitous removal of the colonial apparatus and 
ethnically stoked conflict.  Darfur’s genocide, just like the 
greater civil war, requires an overhaul of the Sudan’s political 
structure.  “With only vague demands for accountability from the 
international community,” Khartoum has been able to prosecute 
wars of aggression throughout its entire periphery.113  Indeed, 
just like the United States’ failure to fully comprehend the 
enormity of the Sudan’s civil war, the world at large continues 
to bury its head in the sand, refusing to take bold action 
against Khartoum.
The sad fact is that violence defines political differences 
and aspirations in the Sudan.  The fluid nature and changing 
111 Prunier, Darfur, 97-98.
112 Ardenne, et al, Explaining Darfur, 14.
113 Miller, “Crisis in Darfur,” 130
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positions of the combatants as well as the contradictory 
policies emanating from disparate political groups in the South 
and Khartoum  made it difficult for the U.S. Congress and 
national media to  comprehend the war’s complexity and nuance. 
This chronic lack of understanding has limited the United 
States’ ability to effectively work toward substantive change in 
the Sudan.   Indeed, Robert Collins had it right: the United 
States has had little more to offer the Sudan than “tea and 
sympathy.”114
United States’ limited abilities to effect change in the 
Sudan has not deterred it from trying.  The daunting task of 
helping to bring an end to such an enduring, intractable war has 
proven quite difficult.  The threat of terrorism has added a 
new, more immediate wrinkle to U.S. involvement in the Sudan. 
The Bush administration, however, has not used the “War on 
Terror” as a new raison d’être to become involved in Sudanese 
politics.  The U. S. goal remains ending the war, rebuilding 
southern Sudan, and resolving the genocide in Darfur.  Astutely, 
John Danforth, U.S. special envoy to the Sudan, sees “America’s 
own preoccupations with identity politics and minority rights” 
in the Sudan’s conflict.115  While autonomy for the South remains 
the primary stumbling block for peace talks, Danforth decided 
that the United States would not seek self-determination for the 
114 Robert O. Collins, testifying in The Crisis in Sudan, May 4, 1993,30.
115 Johnson, Root Causes, 178.
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South as a pre-condition in U.S. sponsored peace talks.  
The latest attempts at peace emanating from the United 
States, the Machakos Protocol in 2002, occurred in spite of a 
rift between the White House and the State Department over self-
determination.  The White House indicated a preference toward 
self-determination for the South while Danforth and the State 
Department worked to keep the Sudan whole.  The Machakos 
Protocol was more a template for future peace talks than a peace 
plan.  Calling for a referendum on self-determination for the 
South, the Protocol reconfirmed the sectarian nature of the 
Sudanese government.116  Since 2002, the U.S. has been preoccupied 
with its two wars, in Iraq and Afghanistan, and has not 
allocated the “necessary diplomatic resources” to the peace 
process.117  The lack of U.S. involvement has led to ineffective 
peace settlements.  The 2005 peace accord signed by both 
Khartoum and the SPLM/A has not managed to end the violence in 
the Sudan.  Khartoum’s aspirations for the oil in the South have 
created a secondary genocide as the government continues to push 
Nuer and Dinka off of the oil rich lands.  Khartoum’s refusal to 
accept oil revenue sharing as a part of the peace plan begs the 
question; how can peace gain traction if the government 
continues to perpetuate genocide?  
116 Johnson, Root Causes, 179.
117 Eric Reeves, “Peace or War? The Moment of Truth for Sudan,” 
Mediterranean Quarterly 14 (Winter 2003): 85.
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President Beshir refuses to rule in accordance with the 
2005 peace agreement as this would require a relative decrease 
in personal power.118  Without willingness on the part of Beshir 
and his political party to relinquish some control, it becomes 
obvious that a viable peace process requires an increase in 
political pressure from the United States and the international 
community at large.  But that process begins with an 
understanding of the conflict as it is, not as the West wants to 
see it.  Perhaps a commitment to this type of understanding will 
allow the United States to offer the victims of the Sudanese 
Civil War more than mere “tea and sympathy.”
118 Pierre Engelbert and Denis Tull, “Postconflict Reconstruction in 
Africa: Flawed Ideas about Failed States,” International Security 32 (Spring 
2008): 124.
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